This paper develops a new method of estimating risk aversion using data on labor supply behavior. In particular, I show that existing evidence on labor supply behavior places a tight upper bound on risk aversion in the expected utility model. I derive a formula for the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ( ) in terms of (1) the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to the wage elasticity and (2) the degree of complementarity between consumption and labor. I bound the degree of complementarity using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies randomly across states. Using labor supply elasticity estimates from thirty-three studies, I …nd a mean estimate of 1: I then show that generating > 2 would require that wage increases cause sharper reductions in labor supply than estimated in any of the studies. (JEL D80, J20, J60)
Expected utility is the canonical theory of choice under uncertainty in economics. In the expected utility model, risk aversion arises from the curvature of the utility function, typically measured by the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ( ). Despite its importance in many microeconomic and macroeconomic models, the value of remains disputed, largely because of limitations in estimating risk aversion empirically. This paper develops a new method of estimating using data on labor supply behavior.
In particular, I show that existing evidence on the e¤ects of wage changes on labor supply imposes a tight upper bound on the curvature of utility over wealth ( < 2). Hence, the standard expected utility model cannot generate high levels of risk aversion without contradicting established facts about labor supply.
Labor supply behavior and risk aversion are tightly linked in the expected utility model because both are determined by the curvature of utility over consumption. To see the connection, consider the e¤ect of a wage increase on labor supply in a static model where an agent maximizes utility over consumption and leisure. If the marginal utility of consumption diminishes quickly, the individual becomes sated with goods as wages rise. A highly risk averse individual will therefore choose to consume more leisure (by reducing labor supply) as wages rise. More generally, a higher curvature of utility over consumption implies a lower uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply.
The bound on risk aversion is obtained by combining this logic with empirical evidence on the wage elasticity. A well established …nding of the labor supply literature is that wage increases do not cause sharp reductions in labor supply. This lower bound on the wage elasticity of labor supply places an upper bound on the curvature of utility over consumption and hence on risk aversion. The fact that individuals do not choose to reduce labor supply sharply when wages rise implies that their marginal utility of consumption does not diminish quickly, unless consumption and labor are very complementary.
If complementarity between consumption and labor is su¢ ciently strong, even highly risk averse individuals may choose not to reduce labor supply when wages rise because increased consumption makes work less painful. Therefore, bounding using labor supply elasticities requires that we …rst bound the degree of complementarity between consumption and labor. Such a bound can be obtained from evidence on consumption choices when agents face uncertainty about labor supply. Intuitively, the extent to which an agent chooses to correlate consumption with labor across states where labor supply varies exogenously (e.g., because of job loss or disability) reveals the degree of complementarity. Combining the bound on complementarity with estimates of labor supply elasticities yields a bound on that does not rely on any assumptions beyond those inherent in expected utility theory.
I formalize the preceding logic in a dynamic lifecycle model with arbitrary non-separable utility over consumption and leisure. I derive a formula for in terms of the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to the substitution elasticity of labor supply along with the cardinal complementarity parameter. I bound the complementarity parameter using a set of estimates of the consumption drop associated with job loss and other exogenous shocks to labor supply. I then estimate using labor supply elasticity estimates from various types of microeconomic studies -e.g., structural lifecycle methods, natural experiments, and earned income responses -as well as macroeconomic observations such as the downward trend in labor supply over the past century. Using thirty-three sets of estimates of wage and income elasticities, the mean implied value of is 0:71, with a range of 0:15 to 1:78 in the additive utility case. At the upper bound for complementarity, the mean value of rises modestly, to 0:97.
I clarify why all the labor supply studies imply a low level of despite disagreement about the magnitudes of the elasticities using a calibration argument. I show that generating > 2 with a plausible level of complementarity requires an uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply more negative than that estimated in any of the thirty-three studies.
The bound on risk aversion derived here contrasts with the much higher estimates of risk aversion obtained in studies of asset and insurance markets (e.g., Rajnish Mehra and Edward Prescott 1985 , Narayana Kocherlakota 1996 , Robert Barsky et. al. 1997 , Alma Cohen and Liran Einav 2005 , Justin Sydnor 2005 . Hence, one interpretation of the result is that it provides new evidence against the canonical expected utility theory as a descriptive model of choice under uncertainty. Importantly, the calibration argument here restricts risk preferences over all risks, and not just the small gambles or low probability events that are the basis of many existing critiques (Chris Starmer 2000).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I gives graphical intuition for the bounding argument, and derives a formula for risk aversion in terms of labor supply elasticities and complementarity between consumption and labor. Section II implements the formula using existing estimates of these parameters. Section III discusses how this paper is related to other recent calibration arguments for risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Section IV concludes.
I Theory
Setup. Consider a T period life-cycle model. Denote consumption in each period by c t and labor supply by l t . Let U (c 1 ; :::; c T ; l 1 ; :::; l T ) denote utility over the consumption and labor streams. Let p t denote the price of consumption in period t. Assume that U is smooth and that U ct > 0; U lt < 0; u ctct < 0; u ltlt < 0. Let w t denote the wage in period t and y unearned income (wealth) at time 0. In Thomas MaCurdy's (1981) terminology, a change in t is a transitory wage change, while changes in w are permanent wage changes, i.e. shifts in the entire pro…le of wages over a lifetime.
The agent chooses a path of consumption and labor by solving max ct;lt U (c 1 ; :::; c T ; l 1 ; :::; l T ) s.t. p 1 c 1 + ::: + p T c T = y + w( 1 l 1 + :::
It is convenient to rewrite this problem as a two-stage maximization:
where u(c; l) = max ct;lt U (c 1 ; :::; c T ; l 1 ; :::; l T )
In (1), c and l represent aggregates that capture total consumption and labor supply over the lifecycle. The function u(c; l) is indirect utility over these two composite commodities.
Our goal is to derive a bound for the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of the indirect utility function u(c; l), de…ned as follows:
Note that is the curvature of utility over wealth -the parameter that determines risk preferences over immediately-resolved wealth gambles in an expected utility model -when total labor supply l is …xed. When l is variable, the curvature of utility over wealth is strictly lower than (see appendix A for a proof). Intuitively, if the agent can adjust labor supply, he has more ‡exibility to adjust to wealth shocks, and is less risk averse (Zvi Bodie et. al. 1992) . A bound on therefore bounds risk aversion when l is endogenous as well.
Bounding Risk Aversion: Graphical Example. The main result follows from the comparative statics implied by the agent's …rst order condition for l. At an interior optimum, the marginal bene…t of working an extra hour equals the marginal cost: Figure 1 illustrates the calibration argument using this …rst order condition. It plots the marginal consumption utility of working an extra hour, wu c (y + wl; l) and the marginal disutility of working that hour, u l (y + wl; l). The initial level of labor supply, l 0 , is determined by the intersection of these two curves at the initial wage w 0 . For simplicity, the …gure is drawn for a case where the agent has no unearned income (y = 0).
Suppose …rst that the agent has additive utility over c and l (u cl = 0). Consider the e¤ect of raising w by 1 percent on l. This change has two e¤ects on the wu c curve, which correspond to a substitution and income e¤ect on labor supply. The substitution e¤ect is that the number multiplying u c rises by 1 percent, shifting the wu c curve upward by 1 percent. The 1 percent increase in w also increases consumption (wl) at any given level of l by 1 percent. A 1 percent increase in consumption lowers u c by " uc;c = , so the 1 percent wage increase shifts the wu c curve downward by percent via the income e¤ect. The total shift in the wu c curve is thus (1 ) percent. This expression shows that higher makes the wage elasticity of labor supply more negative by magnifying the income e¤ect. Intuitively, when is high, the marginal bene…t of consumption falls quickly as the wage rises. This strengthens the incentive to consume more leisure (by reducing l) when w rises.
Since changes in w do not a¤ect the u l curve when u cl = 0, it follows that @l=@w > 0 , < 1 when y = 0. This result is the simplest version of the bound on risk aversion imposed by labor supply behavior. The remainder of the paper generalizes this bound to allow for positive unearned income (y > 0), a potentially negative wage elasticity of labor supply, and complementarity between c and l. These factors loosen the bound on slightly (to < 2), but the basic logic of the calibration argument is the same: If upward shifts in the wage pro…le do not cause sharp reductions in lifetime labor supply, must be small.
Complementarity between c and l causes shifts in the u l curve in Figure 1 as w rises. If u cl > 0, the u l curve shifts outward when w rises and l rises more than it would if u cl = 0.
Consequently, the value of estimated from labor supply elasticities under the assumption that u cl = 0 understates the true if u cl > 0. This issue is addressed below using empirical evidence from studies of consumption smoothing to place bounds on the magnitude of u cl .
Given these bounds, the range of possible shifts in the u l curve is narrow, as illustrated by the shaded region in Figure 1 . The bound on is thus loosened modestly when plausible levels of complementarity are permitted.
An Estimator for . To generalize the example in Figure 1 , I derive a formula for in terms of labor supply elasticities. Implicitly di¤erentiate (3) to obtain:
Using the Slutsky decomposition for compensated labor supply (
it follows that the ratio of the income e¤ect to the substitution e¤ect is given by
Let " 
This equation shows that is determined by the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to the substitution elasticity of labor supply, with an adjustment for complementarity between c and l. 1 This is because the income e¤ect is proportional to u cc (how much the marginal consumption utility from working falls when y is raised) while the substitution e¤ect is proportional to u c (how much the marginal consumption utility from working rises when w is raised). For example, when utility is linear in c, there are no income e¤ects in labor supply, and = 0. Note that the formula for in (7) does not rely on any functional form assumptions; hence, the bounds derived below apply to any utility function.
Cardinality and Complementarity. It may be surprising that a unique value for can be identi…ed from labor-leisure choices. Since non-linear monotonic transformations of u(c; l)
do not a¤ect the choice of l, are there not in…nitely many values of that could be associated with a given set of labor supply data? The reason that is identi…ed in (7) is that any non-linear transformation of u would change the value of " uc;l . For example, non-linear transformations of an additive u (with u cl = 0) destroy additivity. Labor supply data are thus su¢ cient to identify conditional on the value " uc;l , which pins down the cardinal normalization of u.
Since the cardinal complementarity parameter " uc;l is unknown, it must be estimated from choices under uncertainty. A natural method of estimating " uc;l is to examine the 1 Note that (7) remains well de…ned when y = 0. In that case, the …rst term in (7) equals @lw @y =" l c ;w . The @lw @y term is the propensity to earn out of unearned income (in dollars rather than a percentage, which would be unde…ned).
consumption choices of individuals who face exogenous variation in labor supply across states, e.g. due to a shock such as job displacement. Intuitively, if agents choose to consume a lot more in states where labor supply is high, c and l must be highly complementary; if in contrast labor supply ‡uctuations are not correlated with consumption changes, c and l must not be very complementary.
To obtain an estimate of " uc;l based on this logic, consider a setting with two states where agents work for l 1 hours in state 1 (which occurs with probability p) and l 2 hours in state 2 (probability 1 p). Assume that preferences are state-independent, i.e. the utility function in the two states is the same. Let w s denote the wage in state s. Suppose the agent can trade consumption at an actuarially fair rate between the two states using an insurance policy. We will see below that if perfect insurance of this form is unavailable, the exercise below provides an upper bound for " uc;l and thereby an upper bound for .
Conditional on (l 1 ; l 2 ), the agent chooses a consumption allocation (c 1 ; c 2 ) to maximize expected utility:
At the optimal (c 1 ; c 2 ), marginal utilities are equated across the states:
The remainder of this section exploits this condition to link the " uc;l parameter of interest to a magnitude that can be empirically estimated. Let c = c 
where R, the remainder, must satisfy lim l!0 R = 0. Therefore, in the optimal allocation,
Equation (8) shows that " uc;l is proportional to c c = l l , the percentage drop in consumption associated with a 1 percent di¤erence in labor supply across states. This expression re ‡ects the intuition described above: If the consumption change across states where labor supply di¤ers is small, " uc;l must be small. The curvature of utility ( ) is also relevant because it determines the cost of consumption ‡uctuations in the expected utility model. The limit l ! 0 is necessary because " uc;l can be identi…ed at a given point (c 1 ; l 1 ) without functional form assumptions only by observing the e¤ect of small variations in l on c.
Importantly, in the more realistic case where insurance markets are incomplete, consumption will fall beyond the optimal amount when labor supply is low. Hence, imperfections in insurance markets will make the observed consumption drop overstate the true complementarity-related consumption drop and consequently overstate the true values of " uc;l and .
Using (8) and (7), we can solve for to obtain an estimator for risk aversion in terms of magnitudes that can be empirically estimated:
Extensive Margin. The best established e¤ects of wage changes are on the participation margin, perhaps because …xed costs of participation and institutional restrictions limit hours choices (see e.g. Joseph Altonji and Christina Paxson 1991) . Estimates of participation elasticities can also be used to infer . Let denote the fraction of agents who work, " ;y the income elasticity of participation, and " ;w the wage elasticity of participation. Let c c denote the di¤erence in consumption when working and not working chosen by the agent in an experiment involving uncertain labor supply analogous to the complementarity exercise described above. Under a constant-approximation of u(c; l), a formula similar to (9) is obtained for :
II Empirical Implementation
II.A Estimates of Complementarity
Equation (9) shows that an upper bound on c c = l l is required to obtain an upper bound on .
A bound on complementarity would ideally be derived from the consumption choices of agents who face small, permanent exogenous shocks to labor supply. 3 The most obvious empirical analogs to this experiment are estimates of the consumption change associated with shocks such as job loss or disability. John Cochrane (1991) and Jonathan Gruber (1997 Gruber ( , 1998 …nd that job loss causes a consumption drop of less than 10 percent. In subsequent work, (2005) show that consumption does not fall at all for individuals with positive liquid wealth prior to job loss. In addition, these studies …nd that higher unemployment bene…ts are associated with smaller consumption drops, and that with full insurance, there would be no drop at all. These results imply that most of the observed 10 percent consumption drop is due to imperfect insurance markets rather than complementarity between consumption and labor.
Martin Browning and Thomas Crossley (2001) and Hans Bloemen and Elena Stancanelli
There are two concerns in connecting the 10 percent bound to the actual if complementarity is much greater for small ‡uctuations in l than large ones. This concern is unlikely to be a serious problem in practice.
Studies that examine smaller ‡uctuations in hours than full unemployment (e.g. , Browning et. al. 1985) …nd estimates of c c = l l that are of the same magnitude as those reported by studies of larger ‡uctuations in l. Moreover, most of the changes in labor supply resulting from changes in wages and unearned income tend to be large and discrete as well (e.g., from 20 to 40 hours). The range of l over which complementarity is estimated is therefore similar to the range over which the labor supply elasticities themselves are estimated. As equation (10) for the extensive margin case shows, if only discrete changes in labor supply are feasible, it is preferable to have estimates of the consumption drop when l ‡uctuates over a similar set of discrete values. 4 The second concern, which is deeper, is that studies of job loss examine temporary ‡uctuations in labor (variation in l t for a given period t) and not permanent ‡uctuations (variation in l). In the notation of the model, these studies estimate Intuitively, if consumption is complementary across periods (as in habit formation models), agents will be more reluctant to cut consumption in response to transitory ‡uctuations in labor than permanent ones. Durability of consumption and adjustment costs could further attenuate the short-run response.
To gauge the di¤erence between short-run and long-run complementarity, I use evidence on consumption responses to long-term labor supply changes induced by disability or retirement. Cochrane (1991) …nds that long-term disabilities cause a 11 percent drop in food consumption in the year that the shock occurs. Melvin Stephens (2001) shows that in the …ve years after disability occurs, consumption does not trend downward signi…cantly, and is at most 10 percent lower than the pre-disability level. These results suggest that long-run complementarity ( ) complementarity. If it were, there would be either a large immediate drop in consumption or a sharp downward trend in consumption in the years after disability. 4 Relatedly, the estimates of based on participation elasticities -which require estimates of c c from ‡uctuations in labor force participation -yield very similar estimates of (see Table 1 ). This suggests that discreteness is unlikely to be an important source of bias here.
5 See the appendix in Chetty (2006) for a formal derivation relating the two parameters. Karen Dynan (2001) …nds no complementarity in consumption across periods in microdata, but studies using macro data …nd evidence of habit.
In related work, Paul Gertler and Gruber (2002) …nd that long-term health shocks leading to job loss are associated with less than a 20 percent reduction in non-health consumption (which includes durables) in Indonesia. Gertler and Gruber test whether incomplete insurance or complementarity between c and l is responsible for this drop in several ways. For instance, they show that the consumption drop is small in families where the person experiencing the shock is not the sole earner (because other household members help to smooth consumption). They conclude from this and other evidence that the complementarity-related portion of the 20 percent drop is close to zero.
One concern with the disability-based evidence is that the assumption of state-independent preferences may not hold for health shocks. 
II.B Labor Supply Elasticities
This section describes a set of elasticity estimates from studies of labor supply and reports the implied by each study. There is a controversial debate about which empirical methods yield the most reliable estimates of labor supply elasticities. I show that irrespective of the method used to estimate the elasticities, the implied value of is always low.
Labor supply studies can be broadly classi…ed into four categories: (1) The "static" approach estimates reduced-form labor supply responses to events such as tax changes, cross-sectional di¤erences, or lottery winnings. Richard Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) show that these static estimates can be interpreted as labor supply responses to the permanent changes in wages and unearned income of interest when an appropriate set of controls for age and cohort are included. (2) The "life cycle" or "structural" literature, pioneered by MaCurdy (1981), explicitly models dynamic labor supply and consumption choices and backs out estimates of labor supply responses to permanent shifts in wage pro…les and unearned income from life cycle variation in wages in a panel dataset. These estimates correspond more directly to the permanent wage-elasticities (e.g., " c l;w ) of interest, but identi…cation of these models is often di¢ cult because of the lack of exogenous shifts in wage pro…les. Recent studies that combine the bene…ts of exogenous variation used in the static studies with the structural lifecycle approach give perhaps the most credible microeconomic estimates of long-run wage elasticities (Blundell et. al. 1998) . (3) A more recent "earned income" literature, starting with Martin Feldstein (1995 Feldstein ( , 1999 , examines the e¤ect of tax reforms on total earned income as a means of capturing other margins of labor supply beyond hours (e.g., e¤ort or job-related training). Estimates from this literature can be used to estimate by replacing the elasticity ratio " l;y " l c ;w used in (7) with
, where LI is labor income and 1 the net-of-tax rate. (4) Finally, long-run macroeconomic trends and cross-country comparisons can be used to make inferences about long-run labor supply elasticities, potentially overcoming the institutional rigidities and some of the omitted variable biases that may a¤ect the microeconomic studies.
8 Table 1 To obtain a broad sense of the values of consistent with labor supply evidence, the table 8 The elasticities from the micro-level studies should yield consistent estimates of even if there are frictions which prevent agents from reoptimizing fully in the short-run. These frictions presumably attenuate both " l;y and " c l;w , leaving the ratio of the two elasticities una¤ected.
includes elasticity estimates for a wide range of groups, such as prime age males, married women, retired individuals, and low income families. Estimates of are computed at the mean values of y; w; and l in each study. Note that the mean values of y wl vary widely across the studies. For example, married women's unearned income equals at least their husband's income, which is generally larger than their own earned income.
Column (6) of Table 1 
II.C A Calibration Argument
The similarity of the estimates of across the labor supply studies despite their di¤erences in methodology, de…nitions of labor supply, and sample composition may be surprising. This section provides a calibration argument that explains the consensus on . Intuitively, the consensus emerges from the uniform …nding that " l;w is not very negative, which implies that the income elasticity cannot be large relative to the substitution elasticity. This places an upper bound on because it depends on the ratio of these two elasticities.
To formalize this argument, consider …rst the common benchmark of an upward-sloping labor supply curve (Prescott (1986) , Robert Hall and John Taylor (1991) ).
10
Using the 9 John Pencavel (1986), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) , and Gruber and Emmanuel Saez (2002) summarize more than sixty other microeconomic studies that span various methodologies, nearly all of which imply < 1:25 as well. 10 In a recent survey of 134 labor and public economists at 40 leading research institutions, Victor Fuchs, Alan Krueger, and James Poterba (1998) found that the vast majority of these experts believe that the best estimate of the uncompensated wage elasticity is weakly positive. is that generating signi…cantly greater than 2 would require complementarity and labor supply patterns that contradict evidence to date sharply. 11 The Slutsky decomposition for a wage increase is " l;w = " l c ;w + lw y " l;y , where the …rst term on the right hand side is the substitution e¤ect and the second is the income e¤ect. Hence I = lw y " l;y corresponds to the (absolute value of) the income e¤ect of a wage increase.
III Discussion
A few recent papers have also conducted "internal consistency checks"of standard models of consumption behavior. Most relevant is Susanto Basu and Miles Kimball [BK] (2002) , who build on Robert King et. al. (1988) . BK show that reconciling low estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) with " l;w 0 requires either strong complementarity between consumption and labor or time non-separable utility. To see how our results are related, consider the case where utility is additive over c and l. Here, the BK result is that time separability is inconsistent with " l;w > 0 and low EIS. In contrast, this paper shows that state separability (expected utility theory) is inconsistent with " l;w > 0 and high . The two results thus address two aspects of preferences -intertemporal substitution and risk aversion -that are empirically and intuitively distinct (Hall (1988 ), Philippe Weil (1990 ), Larry Epstein and Stanley Zin (1991 ). While the BK result leaves unidenti…ed, the bound in this paper leaves the EIS unrestricted because U ( ) is permitted to be an arbitrary time non-separable function. 12 Similarly, while habit formation (which drops time separability)
can resolve the BK bound on the EIS, it does not relax the bound on risk aversion.
13
Matthew Rabin (1999) 12 Another way to see this point is to consider Kreps-Porteus utility. When the only risk at issue is an immediately resolved one, the Kreps-Porteus speci…cation is a special case of the general time non-separable class of utility functions analyzed above. Consequently, the arguments above bound risk aversion over immediately-resolved wealth gambles for a Kreps-Porteus utility, but do not pin down the EIS. 13 The upper bound of < 2 derived here directly implies a lower bound for the EIS of 1 2 in models that assume time-separable utility.
IV Conclusion
A large literature on labor supply has found that the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is not very negative. This observation places a bound on the rate at which the marginal utility of consumption diminishes, and thus bounds risk aversion in an expected utility model. The central estimate of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion implied by labor supply studies is 1 (log utility) and an upper bound is 2, accounting for substantial complementarity between consumption and labor. The intuition for this tight bound is simple: If the marginal utility of wealth diminishes rapidly, why don't people choose to work much less when their wages rise?
This result implies that diminishing marginal utility of wealth plays a secondary role in generating the high levels of risk aversion estimated in some studies of choice under uncertainty. An additional, quantitatively powerful source of risk aversion must be identi…ed to explain observed behavior in these cases.
14 Testing alternative models of risk preferences under the constraints on curvature imposed by labor supply behavior would be an interesting it follows that v yy = u cc @c @y + u cl @l @y
Recall the expression for @l=@y in (4):
where K = 1 w 2 ucc+2wu cl +u ll . Equation (5) 
Now plug in using (11) for @l=@y in the preceding expression to obtain
It follows that v yy > u cc which implies
This proves that y < , i.e. that the curvature of utility over wealth is lower when l is endogenous.
Appendix B: Construction of Tables 1 and 2 Notes on . All other rows in part A use the mean reported values of y and wl in conjunction with the elasticity estimates reported in that study. In part B, I use the CRRA approximation used to derive equation (10) . The compensated wage elasticity estimates in the earned income literature are the elasticity of earned income with respect to the net of tax rate.
In part D, for the Blau and Kahn (2005) study, I take the average of the three sets of substitution elasticities reported for three di¤erent periods. The income elasticity is de…ned as the elasticity of women's hours with respect to husband's wages and computed in corresponding fashion. I estimate using the mean value of y and wl reported by Blau and Kahn for their sample.
For the remaining two studies in part D, I …rst estimate the uncompensated wage elasticity " l;w from Mulligan (2002) , who reports a 25 percent drop in aggregate hours over the 20th century while real hourly wages rose by roughly a factor of 8. This implies " l;w 0:035. To account for the possibility that labor supply might be less arduous than it was 100 years ago (e.g. individuals get more breaks today), I double this value to obtain " l;w = :07. Note that placing a lower bound on " l;w leads to an upper bound on given an estimate of " c l;w . Estimates of the compensated wage elasticity are obtained from other studies that compare trends or levels across countries with varying tax and transfer regimes (Prescott 2004, Davis and Henrekson 2004) . These tax responses can be interpreted as compensated wage elasticities of aggregate labor supply since non-transfer government expenditure can be viewed as unearned income in the aggregate. Income elasticities are then computed for each study using the Slutsky equation under the assumption " l;w = 0:07 with . The overall mean estimates of are unweighted means of the values reported in each study. In computing the mean, the Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) values are given a weight of 20 since this line represents an average of twenty di¤erent studies. Table 2 : The formula used for the calibrations reported in Table 2 is 
Notes on
The values reported in the table are computed using this formula with NOTES --All risk aversion estimates are computed at sample means of y and wl unless noted otherwise. In Part A, the Blundell and MaCurdy estimates are an unweighted average of the 20 elasticities reported in that study and assumes y/wl=1/2. In Part B, calculations of γ assume CRRA utility. In Part C, compensated wage elasticity column reports the elasticity of earned income with respect to the net-of-tax rate. For these studies, the Imbens et. al. estimate of the income elasticity is used to compute g. In Part D, income elasticities for the Davis and Henrekson and Prescott studies are computed from estimates in Mulligan (2002) . See Appendix B for further details on the construction of this table.
